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INSTITUTE OF CONTEMPORARY LAW
CHURCH, STATE AND THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Joseph G. Schumb, Jr.*
For ages men have been seeking to define the appropriate
relationship between religion and the state.1 In our own country
the courts have played an important role in this continuing search.
Among the most publicized decisions of the Supreme Court are
those dealing with this area of constitutional law, especially those
dealing with religious activities or practices in our public schools. In
the last issue of the Santa Clara Lawyer2 the author traced the
history of litigation concerning the constitutionality of prayer recita-
tion and Bible reading in the public schools. That article concluded
with a discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion in the Regents'
Prayer case3 which held that the practice of opening each school day
with a recitation of a "nondenominational" prayer was incompati-
ble with the mandate of the first amendment, applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Since then, on June 17,
1963, the Supreme Court decided School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp,' holding that the practice of starting the
school day with reading passages from the Bible is also unconstitu-
tional. The purpose of this article is to comment on this latest deci-
sion of the Court.
Three cases came before the Supreme Court last term ques-
tioning the constitutionality of Bible reading. Two cases5 were dis-
posed of in one decision and the third" was remanded to the state
* A.B., Brown University, 1951; LL.B., Harvard University, 1954. Member,
Massachusetts and California Bars; Deputy County Counsel, Santa Clara County,
California; Instructor in Law, San Francisco Law School.
1 See, generally, BARKER, CHURCH, STATE AND EDUCATION (1957) (Ann Arbor
Paperback Edition).
2 Schumb, Religion in the Public Schools, 3 SANTA CLARA LAW. 135 (1963).
8 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
4 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560 (1963).
5 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560 (1963);
Murray v. Curtlett, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560 (1963).
6 Chamberlain v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction, 83 Sup. Ct. 1864(1963). This case also involved the constitutionality of a variety of religious practices
other than Bible reading. Apparently the Court decided it was not appropriate to pass
on these other practices which included, among others, recitation of prayers and grace,
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supreme court "for further consideration in the light of" the
Schempp decision. The two cases decided were brought by parent-
taxpayers7 and their children who were attending the public schools
where the alleged religious exercises were conducted. They sought
to enjoin the school districts from conducting these exercises on the
ground that they violated the plaintiffs' rights under the first and
fourteenth amendments.
In Schempp the practice was required by state law8 and in
Murray, by a rule of the Baltimore City School Board.'
FACTS
In the opinion for the Court Mr. Justice Clark describes the
actual operation of exercises in the schools attended by the Schempp
children. The students met each morning in their home rooms and
the exercises were broadcast through the intercommunications sys-
tem by the members of the school's radio and television workshop.
The exercises were apparently conducted in a similar fashion in the
Murray case. Mr. Justice Clark said:
Selected students from this course gather each morning in the
school's workshop studio for the exercises, which include readings by
one of the students of 10 verses of the Holy Bible, broadcast to
each room in the building. This is followed by the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer, likewise over the intercommunications system, but also
by the students in the various classrooms, who are asked to stand and
join in repeating the prayer in unison. The exercises are closed with
the flag salute and such pertinent announcements as are of interest
to the students. 10
the use of religious films and displays in connection with the observance of religious
holidays, the presence of religious symbols in the classroom, a Baccalaureate program
conducted in school buildings, and the use of a religious test in the employment and
promotion of school employees. The Court did vacate the judgment. It should be
borne in mind that all three cases were decided before the Supreme Court's opinion
in Engel v. Vitale.
7 In Schempp the parents were Unitarians and in Murray the parent was an
"avowed atheist."
8 24 Pa. Stat. § 15-1516, as amended, Pub. Law 1928 (Supp. 1960) Dec. 17, 1959,
requires that "At least 10 verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment,
at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused
from participating in the opening from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible read-
ing upon the written request of his parent or guardian." (Amendment underlined.)
9 The rule as amended shortly before the suit was filed now reads as follows:
Section 6-Opening Exercise. Each school either collectively or in classes, shall be
opened by reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use
of the Lord's Prayer. The Douay verision may be used by those pupils who prefer it.
Appropriate patriotic exercise should be held as a part of the general opening exercise
of the school or classes. Any child shall be excused from participating in the opening
exercise upon written request of his parent or guardian. (Amendment underlined.)
10 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560, 1563
(1963).
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The participation in the exercises is voluntary according to
Justice Clark. The student reading the verses may choose the ver-
sion and passages of the Bible to be read. In fact, several religious
texts had been used for the ceremonies; the King James, Douay
and Revised Standard Editions, as well as the Jewish Holy Scrip-
tures. In further description of the morning exercises, Justice Clark
said:
There are no prefatory statements, no questions asked or soiicited,
no comments or explanations made and no interpretations given at
or during the exercises. The students and parents are advised that
the student may absent himself from the classroom or, should he
elect to remain, not participate in the exercises."
Mr. and Mrs. Schempp testified that certain doctrines of the
Bible were contrary to their beliefs. Expert testimony was intro-
duced to prove that there are marked differences between various
versions of the Bible, that no version is acceptable to all religious
groups, and that some passages are offensive to members of certain
religions. The Schempps testified that, even though the Bible did
contain beliefs contrary to their own, they did not seek to obtain
permission to excuse their children from participating in the exer-
cises because they felt that it would adversely affect the relation-
ship of their children with their classmates and teachers. Specifically,
they claimed that if their children were excused they would tend to
be labeled "odd balls" and be considered as "Un-American" or im-
moral. They contended, furthermore, that their children would miss
the general announcements which were customarily made imme-
diately after the morning exercises if they left their classroom to
avoid participation. Finally, they argued that the children would
have to stand outside their classrooms in the hall and suffer the
imputation of punishment for bad conduct.
In the Murray case the plaintiff's son was excused from partici-
pation pursuant to her request. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs alleged
that the continuance of the practice violated their rights "in that
it threatens their religious liberty by placing a premium on belief
as against non-belief and subjects their freedom of conscience to
the rule of the majority; it pronounces belief in God as the source
of all moral and spiritual values, equating these values with reli-
gious values, and thereby rendering sinister, alien and suspect the
beliefs and ideals of .... Petitioners, promoting doubt and question
of their morality, good citizenship and good faith." 2
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
[Vol. 4
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LOWER COURT OPINIONS
In the Schempp case, a three judge district court initially found
that the statute and the exercises violated both the free exercise
clause and the establishment clause of the first amendment. 18 The
case was decided before the Pennsylvania legislature amended
the statute to permit nonparticipation.
The district court found that the Bible was a "book of worship"
and that the use of the Bible in this fashion amounted to religious
instruction, which in these circumstances constituted a violation
of the establishment clause. The violation of the free exercise
clause was predicated on the mandatory feature of participation.
The case was taken to the Supreme Court but was remanded after
the statute was amended in order that the Court could consider
what, if any, effect should be given the amendment. 4 Subsequently
the district court reaffirmed its earlier decision on the establishment
clause, but found no infringement on the plaintiffs' free exercise of
religion because of the excusal provision.' The district court relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's opinion in McCollum v. Board of
Education6 which struck down a released time program conducted
on school premises during the regular school day with the active
participation of school district personnel.
In Murray the Supreme Court of Maryland by a divided court
upheld the school board regulation.' The trial court sustained a
demurrer to the complaint and this ruling was upheld on appeal.
A majority of the Maryland Supreme Court conceded that the
Supreme Court of the United States had not passed on the issues
raised in this case, but thought that the Court's decision in Zorach
v. Clauson,'8 which upheld a released time program conducted off
school premises, was controlling. 9 The Court pointed out that the
"use of school time and the expenditure of public funds is negligi-
ble" and that these exercises are analogous to the opening prayer
13 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959). The first amendment provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . ." The clause preceding the conjunctive is referred to as "the
Establishment Clause" and the clause following as "the Free Exercise Clause."
14 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 364 U.S. 298 (1961).
15 Schempp v. School District of Abington Township, 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
16 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
17 Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698 (1962).
18 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
19 Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 250, 179 A.2d 698, 704 (1962), the Court
said: "Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has not yet spoken with respect to the Bible
reading and Prayer recitation ceremonies at school opening exercises, we think we are
bound by what we understand is the effect on McCollum as it is explained and ex-
panded in Zorach until such time as the Court speaks further in this uncertain area."
1963]
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ceremonies in Congress. The majority also thought it significant
that the Supreme Court had remanded the Schempp case to consider
the effect of the statutory amendment permitting nonparticipation.
The dissenting opinion relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in
McCollum and Torcaso v. Watkins.20 In the latter decision, the
Court invalidated a state constitutional provision requiring an
affirmation of belief in the existence of God as a condition of hold-
ing public office. The dissenters rejected the majority view that
participation was "voluntary," in spite of the school board's rule
permitting nonparticipation. They felt that unconstitutional coer-
cion existed because affirmative action was required to seek exemp-
tion. Furthermore, they thought that in these circumstances a non-
participating pupil would be subjected to suspicion and "lose caste"
with his peers if he failed to participate in the exercises. Finally,
they treated the exemption provision as if it required the pupil to
declare his nonbelief as a condition of the exemption and concluded
that under Torcaso a state cannot do this. It appears that the dis-
senters felt that both clauses of the first amendment were violated,
although the opinion rests largely on the establishment violation.
Both Murray and Schempp were granted review and argued
together, and the Supreme Court issued one opinion for both cases.
There was no majority opinion. Mr. Justice Clark wrote for the
Court, but only three other Justices joined with him.21 Four Jus-
tices concurred in three separate opinions, while Mr. Justice Stew-
art dissented.22
Despite the plurality of opinions, there was unanimous agree-
ment on several propositions. All members of the Court adhered
to the view that both first amendment religious clauses apply with
equal vigor to the states and the national government, and that
the first amendment prohibits government from preferring religion
against nonreligion as well as one religion over another.
All members of the Court were also agreed that these cases
were indistinguishable from Engel v. Vitale and no one, except
Mr. Justice Stewart who also dissented in that case indicated that
that decision should be overruled. Since the cases were not distin-
guished from Engel v. Vitale,2" it is somewhat surprising that the
Court felt obliged to write an extended opinion. One explanation
may be found in the failure of the Court in Engel v. Vitale to dis-
cuss or even cite any of its prior first amendment decisions, which
20 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
21 The Chief Justice and Justices Black and White.
22 Justices Douglas and Brennan concurred separately. Justice Goldberg, with
whom Justice Harlan joined, also concurred separately.
23 BARKER, supra note 1, at 149.
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were obviously relevant to the decision. 4 If Schempp gives us
nothing else, at least Mr. Justice Clark has explained why the
Court in Engel v. Vitale believed no citation was necessary. He
says, after discussing these earlier cases and the principles they
announced, that "Finally, in Engel v. Vitale, only last year, these
principles were so universally recognized that the Court without
the citation of a single case and over the sole dissent of Mr. Justice
Stewart reaffirmed them.")25
As is frequently the case in evaluating Supreme Court opinions,
they raise more questions than they answer; however, the Court
does partially lift the "veil of silence" which shrouded Engel v.
Vitale.
OPINION OF THE COURT
To Mr. Justice Clark the guiding standard of church and
state relations is "neutrality." After a brief examination of prior
decisions, he professes to find that the Court has always recognized
this. Zorach is summarily distinguished. After stating that these
exercises are a prescribed part of the curricular conducted in school
buildings by school personnel, he concludes "None of these factors,
other than compulsory school attendance, was present in the pro-
gram upheld in Zorach v. Clauson. 26 The Court's analysis here is
simple. Once it is established that the exercises are "a religious cere-
mony and intended to be so by the state," it follows that "the exer-
cises and the law requiring them are in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause." 7 Although there was no similar finding in Murray
because the case was decided on the pleadings, Mr. Justice Clark
reaches the same conclusion. Since the complaint alleged that the
exercise was sectarian, "The short answer, therefore, is that the
religious character of the exercise was admitted by the State."2
The State's contention that the purpose of the exercises was to
promote moral values, a legitimate secular purpose, was also sum-
marily rejected because the Bible is "an instrument of religion."
This fact the state cannot deny, because it authorizes the use of
the different versions of the Bible and permits objecting pupils to
absent themselves. "The conclusion follows that in both cases the
24 Except a reference to the history of the first amendment contained in Ever-
son v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). This patent omission has not gone
unobserved. See Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, sig-
nifying . .." 1962 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1, 13.
25 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560, 1570
(1963).
26 Id. at 1572.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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laws require religious exercises and such exercises are being con-
ducted in direct violation of the rights of the appellees and peti-
tioners."2 9 By way of explaining just what rights have been in-
fringed, he adds in a footnote:
It goes without saying that the laws and practices involved here can
be challenged only by persons having standing to complain. But the
requirements for standing to challenge state action under the Estab-
lishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do
not include proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed.
McGowan v. Maryland, supra, 366 U.S. at 429-430, 81 S. Ct. 1106-1107,
6 L. Ed. 2d 393. The parties here are school children and their parents,
who are directly affected by the laws and practices against which
their complaints are directed. These interests surely suffice to give
the parties standing to complain. See Engel v. Vitale, supra. Cf.
McCollum v. Board of Education, supra; Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, supra. Compare Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429,
72 Sup. Ct. 394, 96 L. Ed. 475 (1952), which involved the same sub-
stantive issues presented here. The appeal was there dismissed upon
the graduation of the school child involved and because of the ap-
pellants' failure to establish standing as taxpayers.30
Justice Clark also rejects the contention that the invalidity is
cured by the excusal provision. His answer to the claim that these
practices are "relatively minor encroachments on the First Amend-
ment" is that "the breach of neutrality that is today a trickling
stream may all too soon become a raging torrent."'" He rejects in
one sentence the claim that by this decision the Court is fostering an
establishment of a religion of secularism. "While the Free Exercise
clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of
free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could
use the machinery of the state to practice its beliefs."3 He cites with
approval Justice Jackson's often quoted statement from West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,
The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place thembeyond reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to . .. freedom of
worship . . . and other fundamental rights may not be submitted
to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. 3
Finally, Mr. Justice Clark attempts to formulate the standard
of permissible state action under the establishment clause, which
the Court declined to do in Engel v. Vitale. He states the standard as
follows:
29 Ibid.
30 Id. note 9.
81 Id. at 1573.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
[Vol. 4
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[W]hat are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment?
If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enact-
ment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and
a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.3 4
CONCURRING OPINIONS
Mr. Justice Douglas believes that both religious clauses of
the first amendment serve to protect the single goal of individual
religious freedom. Since he finds that plaintiffs have failed to prove
any coercion, he concludes there can be no violation of the free
exercise clause. But he believes there is a violation of the establish-
ment clause, which in his view prohibits all "arrangements" by
which the state lends "its assistance to a church's effort to gain and
help adherents."",
In these cases the state violates the constitution, directly by
conducting religious exercises and indirectly by employing its facili-
ties and funds to aid and support religion. The most effective way,
he says, to aid or to "establish" a religion is to finance it and any
amount of financial support, no matter how small, is illegal. These
"regimes," as he calls the exercises, therefore violate the doctrine
of "neutrality" and must fall.
Mr. Justice Brennan exhaustively examines the prior decisions
of the Court involving the principle of separation and the plethora
of state court decisions dealing with Bible reading. The question,
as he formulates it, is whether these exercises "are involvements of
religion in the public institutions of a kind which offend the First
and Fourteenth Amendments." ' He finds that they are. He ampli-
fies his position by adding that:
[T]he fact is that the line which separates the secular from the
sectarian in American life is elusive. The difficulty of defining the
boundary with precision inheres in a paradox central to our scheme
of liberty. While our institutions reflect a firm conviction that we are
a religious people, those institutions by solemn constitutional injunc-
tion may not officially involve religion in such a way as to prefer,
discriminate against, or oppress, a particular sect or religion. Equally,
the Constitution enjoins those involvements of religious (sic) with
secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities
or religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for
essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means
to serve governmental ends where secular means would suffice.37
34 Id. at 1571.
85 Id. at 1574.
86 Id. at 1576.
87 Ibid.
19631
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
He finds that the exercises are essentially religious activities,
which employ the "organs of government" for religious purposes.
He believes that secular means would adequately serve whatever
secular purpose the exercises may have, i.e., to foster discipline and
tolerance. He also rejects the contentions that the exercises are
saved because of the excusal provision. He finds that this "simply
has no relevance to the establishment question,""8 but it does to
the free exercise problem. He believes that "the excusal procedure
itself operates in such a way as to infringe the rights of free exercise
of those children who wish to be excused" and that a state cannot
"constitutionally require a student to profess publicly his disbelief
as the prerequisite to the exercise of his constitutional right of
abstention.""9 In reaching this conclusion, he relies on two prior
decisions of the Court,40 but more significantly on his conception
of the function and role of the public schools in our society. He
believes that every parent has the right to send his child to a public
school for a secular education free of sectarian influences. He states,
"the public schools . . . serve a uniquely public function; the train-
ing of American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive,
or separatist influences of any sort. .. ,"I If a parent wishes to
provide a sectarian education for his child, he has the right to do so.
But the choice should be made by the parent, not the majority of
voters of the state or school district. The establishment clause pro-
hibits the state from inhibiting this choice by diminishing the attrac-
tiveness of either alternative.
Justice Brennan observes that the Court held that a parent-
taxpayer has standing to attack school practices which infringe the
right of free exercise. He believes that a parent should have the
same standing even if "the gravamen of the lawsuit were exclusively
38 Id. at 1606.
49 Ibid.
40 Mr. Justice Brennan relies on Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) and
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Torcaso,
the Court said no state may force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion." Torcaso, however, did not involve a profession of "disbelief." It is arguable
that a request for permission not to participate in Bible reading exercises constitutes a
profession of "disbelief." On the other hand, immature pupils are more likely to
equate the fact of nonparticipation with "disbelief" than are adults. In Barnette, the
Court denied the state the power to compel a student to pledge allegiance to the
national flag over his objection that to do so would violate his religious beliefs. The
Court pointed out that plaintiffs did not seek to compel the cessation of the exercise,
and nothing in the opinion indicates that the Court thought they would be entitled to
such relief. It has been suggested that a flag salute exercise achieves a secular purpose and
this is within the power of the state, while Bible reading achieves no "primary secular
purpose" and is not within the scope of state power. Choper, Religion in the Public
Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329 (1963).
41 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560, 1582
(1963).
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one of establishment," because the parent is the "person most
directly and immediately concerned about and affected by the chal-
lenged establishment.) 42
Justice Brennan attempts to reconcile prior decisions of the
Court to support his thesis that the first amendment prohibits those
involvements of religion with secular institutions discussed above.
He starts with Everson v. Board of Education, an action brought
to enjoin a school district from reimbursing the parents of Catholic
school pupils for the cost of transportation on public buses to and
from parochial school. The statute by its terms applied to all pupils
who attend any public or private school, except private schools
operated for profit. The Supreme Court upheld the statute and the
payments. Mr. Justice Brennan conceded that the reimbursement of
transportation expense may have "indirectly" fostered the operation
of Catholic schools, and thus ultimately served a religious goal, but
he concluded that "this form of governmental assistance was diffi-
cult to distinguish from myriad other incidental if not insignificant
governmental benefits enjoyed by religious institutions-fire and
police protection, tax exemptions, and the pavement of streets and
sidewalks, for example."43 In attempting to reconcile Zorach v.
Clausen with McCollum v. Board of Education, he finds the
"deeper significance" is that in McCollum "the religious instructor"
was placed in the public school classroom. Thus the aura of author-
ity and respect ordinarily given to the secular teacher was trans-
ferred to the religious instructor, improperly enhancing the position
of religion.
Mr. Justice Brennan seeks to lay to rest the argument that,
if Bible reading is not permissible, then "every vestige, however
slight" of cooperation and accommodation between religion and
government must also be invalid. He devotes several pages of his
opinion to answering this argument. He believes the support and
maintenance of military and prison chaplains is probably per-
missible because no coercion is present. The circumstances of the
soldier and prisoner often place them in situations where they
would have no opportunity to exercise their religious beliefs unless
the government specifically provided for it. Similarly the practice
of invocational prayers in Congress involves no coercion or overt
proselytizing. Tax exemption is valid because, when granted to
religious organizations, it is not because they are religious, but
because government uses this device to encourage educational,
charitable, and eleemosynary activities. Nor are the references to
42 ld. at 1594 note 30.
43 Id. at 1592.
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God prohibited on our coins, documents, public buildings, and in
patriotic songs and exercises. These references are so "interwo-
ven ... into the fabric of our civil polity that its present use may
well not present the type of involvement which the First Amend-
ment prohibits. '44
Mr. Justice Goldberg, with whom Mr. Justice Harlan joined in
concurring, found the considerations which led the Court "to inter-
dict the clearly religious practices presented in these cases ... to
(be) ... wholly compelling; . . .4 He believes that the free exercise
and establishment clauses should be read together in the light of
the single end which they are designed to serve, which is "to pro-
mote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and
tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which secure the best
hope of attainment of that end." 46 He says that if "true religious
liberty" is to be obtained, the government must refrain from engag-
ing in or compelling religious practices, or favoring one religion over
another, or religion over nonreligion. Although he agrees that gov-
ernment must be neutral in its attitude toward religion, its actions
must not be hostile to religion. Nor can the state or the Court ignore
the significance of religion as it affects our people. There must be an
accommodation "without undue involvement of one in the concerns
and practices of the other"; but there is "no simple and clear mea-
sure which by precise application can readily and invariably demark
the permissible from the unpermissible.14 7 The practices here, do
not fall within "any sensible or acceptable concept of compelled
or permitted accommodation and involve the state so significantly
and directly in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to those very
diversive influences and inhibitions of freedom which both religious
clauses of the First Amendment preclude. 48 He points to the
"pervasive religiousity" and the "direct governmental involve-
ment," i.e., use of the prestige, power, and influence of school
staff and authority on impressionable children whose attendance is
compelled during a regular school day. He is careful to point out
that he does not mean that all "incidents of government which im-
port of religion" are barred by the first amendment.
DISSENTING OPINION
Mr. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion. He thought that
the cases should be remanded for the purpose of taking additional
44 Id. at 1614.
45 Id. at 1615.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Id. at 1616.
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evidence. He said that "there is no evidence in either case as to
whether there would exist any coercion of any kinid upon a student
who did not want to participate."4 Of course there was no evidence
in Murray because the case was decided on the pleadings. In
Schempp there was a trial, but Stewart said "the record shows no
more than subjective prophecy by a parent of what he thought would
happen"5 if his child were excused from participation. He believed
that the school authorities could administer the system without
"official coercion." But, he warns, if the timing caused the non-
participating pupils to miss morning announcements or, if the ex-
cusal provision was administered in such a way "as to carry over-
tones of social inferiority, then impermissible coercion would clearly
exist."5
Perhaps the most interesting statement made by Justice Stewart
is that he found a serious free exercise argument "on the part of
those who affirmatively desire to have their children's school day
open with the readings of passages from the Bible."52 The Court's
denial of the majority's wish to utilize the public schools to foster
their own religious beliefs places their religion "at an artificial and
state-created disadvantage." Proscription of these exercises results
in an "establishment of a religion of secularism." In answer to
Justice Brennan's assertion that those who desire sectarian instruc-
tion may have it, but only if they send their children to private or
parochial schools, he replies, "But the consideration which renders
this contention too facile to be determinative has already been
recognized by the Court: 'Freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who
can pay their own way.' Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105."1' Justice Stewart unfortunately does not
amplify his position. Does he mean that parents whose religion im-
poses a duty to send their children to a church-sponsored school,
but who are financially unable to do so, have a constitutional right
to demand governmental financial support? The Supreme Court
has not yet decided if direct governmental financial support of reli-
gious education is even constitutionally permissible. The reverse of
this proposition, i.e., such support is a constitutional mandate, is
indeed novel. It does not appear to be an overstatement to say that,
if his view were accepted, the concept of separation of church and
state would become an anachronism. As noted above, Mr. Justice
49 Id. at 1622.
50 Ibid.
51 Id. note 8.
52 Id. at 1618.
53 Id. at 1619.
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Clark rejected Stewart's view. Whether Stewart himself would
extend his view to its logical conclusion is doubtful, since he cites
McCollum with approval and adds that the state may not support
the "proselytizing activities of religious sects by throwing the weight
of secular authority behind the dissemination of religious tenets." 54
He believes, however, that the state is not doing so here.
The nub of Stewart's opinion is that the exercises coupled
with the excusal provision do not by themselves involve any coer-
cion and he does not believe that the Court should assume other-
wise. In addition, he believes that "each local community and its
school board" and not the Court should decide whether or not the
benefits of a noncoercive religious exercise are commensurate with
"the administrative problems they would create."'55 Of course, if
the exercise were found to be unconstitutional, the fact that it is
held by direction of a local school board rather than the state
legislature would not save it. The Court has previously held that
the action of a local school board is "state action" for the purposes
of the fourteenth amendment.5" Furthermore, Mr. Justice Stewart
seems to overlook the fact that in the Schempp case, at least, the
local school board had no alternative but to conduct the exercises
which were required by state statute.57
ZORACH V. CLAUSON
A good deal of the differences found in the state court opinions
prior to Engel v. Vitale stemmed from the confusion created by
the decision and the dicta in Zorach v. Clauson.58 In Zorach Mr.
Justice Douglas indicated that "accommodation" not "neutrality"
is the proper attitude of government toward religion. 9 Justice
Clark's reaffirmance of the principle of "neutrality" certainly is
consistent with the Court's opinions in Engel and Torcaso, but
his failure to discuss its relevance to Zorach illustrates the difficulty.
54 Ibid.
55 Id. at 1621. Justice Stewart is not alone in holding this view. Dean Griswold
said as much in a speech attacking the Court's decision in Engel v. Vitale. The Dean
expressed his views as follows: "[T]here are some matters which are essentially local
in nature, important matters, but nonetheless matters to be worked out by the people
themselves in their own communities, when no basic rights of others are impaired."
Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme
Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. Rav. 167, 173 (1963).
56 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
57 Whether Dean Griswold would make a distinction between Schempp and
Engel v. Vitale is not clear. In the latter case, the adoption of the Regents' Prayer
was within the discretion of the local school board.
58 As we have already seen, this was one of the principal differences between
the two opinions in Murray.
59 KURLAND, supra note 24, at 27.
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In addition Justice Clark refuses to analyze Zorach in terms of the
"test" which he formulates in Schempp. If there must be a "secular
legislative purpose and primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion," it is difficult to see how released time programs,
upheld in Zorach, can stand. Granted that the words "purpose"
and "primary effect" leave some leeway, it is still difficult to
imagine what secular purpose a release time program serves.60 It
has been suggested that Engel v. Vitale may have presaged the
eventual overturn of Zorach and the invalidation of release time
programs.6 The difficulty here is that the Court formulates a test
but then fails to apply it.
Goldberg is probably unwilling to go this far because he
eschews any formulation of principle and on several occasions
uses the phrase "permissible accommodations" rather than "neu-
trality." He does not mention Zorach at all, nor does Justice
Douglas who authored that opinion. But, if Goldberg can find a
prohibited "arrangement" by which the state lends "its assistance
to a church's effort to gain and help adherents" in these cases, it
is difficult to see how he could uphold a released time program.
Justice Brennan stated that " the distinction which the Court drew
in Zorach between the two cases is in my view faithful to the func-
tion of the establishment clause."6 The "crucial difference" between
Zorach and McCollum he observed, was not that school facilities
were used, but that a religious instructor in a secular classroom
gained the status of a secular teacher. When the released time pro-
gram is measured by the standard he proposes, it is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that such a program is one of those "involvements
of religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially
religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs
of government for essentially religious purposes .... ."'s Even if
a released time program does serve some secular purpose and is
not invalid under (a), it would seem to be a prime example of the
employment of an organ of government, i.e., the entire public
school system, for religious purposes and thus fall under paragraph
(b). Of course one might readily concede that neither Clark nor
Brennan intended their "tests" to be mechanically applied. But it
is troublesome to observe that neither seem willing to reconcile his
own formula with a decision that has caused so much confusion.
60 See, Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Stand-
ard, 47 MmNr. L. REV. 329 (1963).
61 KURLAND, supra note 24, at 32.
62 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560, 1592
(1963).
63 Id. at 1576.
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COERCION AND STANDING
One respected commentator has said that "[T]he factor of
coercion is difficult of measurement and more difficult of evaluation
in terms of the appropriate effect to be given specific excuse from
the obligation of participation. . . . Despite frequent disclaimers
of reliance, it is clear that the notion of coercion has played an
important part in the decision-making process." '64 How much a part
coercion plays is one of the problems. Another commentator predi-
cates his proposed standard on the existence of coercion. He be-
lieves "the establishment clause . . . is violated when the state
engages in what may be fairly characterized as solely religious
activity that is likely to result in (1) compromising the student's
religious or conscientious beliefs or (2) influencing the student's
freedom of religious or conscientious choice."65 A third commentator
has denied the existence of any coercion or compulsion at all. He
characterizes these exercises in the following terms:
The child of nonconforming or minority group is, to be sure,
different in his beliefs. That is what it means to be a member of a
minority. Is it not desirable, and educational, for him to learn and
observe this, in the atmosphere of the school-not so much that he
is different, as that other children are different from him: And is it
not desirable that, at the same time, he experiences and learns the
fact that his difference is tolerated and accepted? No compulsion
is put upon him. He need not participate. 66
Justice Brennan is the only member of the Court who explicitly
states that coercion is present in the Bible reading exercises. The
significance of this statement should not be dismissed, even though
he also states that coercion need not be present to prove an establish-
ment violation. He indicates its importance when he states that
governmentally sponsored military chaplains and opening prayers
in Congress do not violate the establishment clause because the
element of coercion is absent. Justice Clark cites approvingly from
the passage in Engel v. Vitale which indicates the Court thought
coercion was not a prerequisite for finding a violation of the es-
tablishment clause, but he otherwise does not express his views on
the point. He also reserves judgment on the validity of the govern-
ment support of military chaplains.67 Justices Stewart and Douglas
apparently agree with Dean Griswold that no coercion has been
proved. The other two members of the Court fail to discuss this
issue.
64 KURLAND, supra note 24, at 30.
65 CHOPER, supra note 60, at 330.
66 Griswold, supra note 55, at 177.
67 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560, 1575
(1963).
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It appears that there is a close relationship between the coer-
cion and the standing to sue. In its eagerness to hold that no coer-
cion is necessary to prove an establishment violation, the Court
either overlooks or ignores the question of whether or not coercion
does in fact exist. The Court may prefer to ignore this problem
because the existence of coercion is difficult to measure and its
effect, if found, is difficult to determine. It does not appear that
Schempp throws any additional light on this problem.
The issue of standing is bound up in the merits of the sub-
stantive right. In these cases, where the right alleged to have been
violated rests on the Constitution, standing is indistinguishable
from the right itself, for a denial of Schempp's claim on the stand-
ing issue is tantamount to a denial on the merits.68 For this rea-
son standing and coercion are interrelated. In Zorach the Court
held a parent had standing to attack the released time program,
even in the absence of an "expenditure of public funds." In Engel
v. Vitale the plaintiffs alleged but did not establish any facts to
show an economic loss to any plaintiff. In neither Engel v. Vitale
nor the present cases was the issue of standing raised, and no
attempt was made to discuss it fully. Justices Clark and Brennan
agreed that the plaintiffs, as parents of pupils, were sufficiently
affected by the practices to entitle them to have standing.69 Jus-
tice Brennan added that he thought that the parents have "very
real grievances."
It has been suggested that there are some logical difficulties
in permitting a parent to attack an establishment violation which
involves neither public cost nor a free exercise infringement. 70
However, unless the establishment clause violation always in-
volves a companion free exercise claim, i.e., unless the scope of
the two clauses is identical, then the free exercise clause will not
always be available to give standing. If the limitations embodied
in the establishment clause are to be judicially enforced, some-
one must have standing to bring the matter before a court for
decision. It may be generally true "that legislatures are ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite the
same degree as the courts,"'" but one rather believes that "the
very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy.17 2 As this
68 Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of "standing", 14 STAN. L. REV.
433, 439 (1962).
69 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560 (1963).
70 Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REV. 25, 41 (1962).
71 Holmes, J., in Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
72 Jackson, J., in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
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author indicated before73 the interest of parents and children in
the operation of the public schools seem sufficiently great to justify
permitting them to raise the issue of establishment. The state
courts have consistently found the parent's interest sufficient to
bring actions dealing with religious exercises. Although this in
itself does not satisfy federal standing requirements in every case,
it should in this case.
CONCLUSION
It is appropriate to conclude by commenting on the relation-
ship between the two religious clauses and the role of the Supreme
Court in constitutional litigation. Two members of the Court and
its recent decision in Schempp suggests the magnitude of the prob-
lems created by the double aspect of the first amendment. Jus-
tices Brennan and Stewart suggest that servicemen who are de-
prived of the opportunity to practice their religion because their
duties take them away from home may have the right to claim
a denial of the free excercise clause unless the government furnishes
military chaplains.74 This seems consistent with Justice Stewart's
assertion that those who want Bible reading in the public schools
may have a similar claim. The merit of this position has already
been discussed. The suggestion on the part of Justice Brennan,
however, seems difficult to reconcile with his formulation of the
principle underlying the establishment clause. His position serves
to illustrate the difficulty of reconciling the competing claims of
the two clauses and the limitations of applying his formulation in
other cases.
In a case decided on the same day as the Bible reading cases
the Court held under the free exercise clause that South Carolina
could not constitutionally deny unemployment benefits to a Sev-
enth Day Adventist who was discharged because she would not
work on Saturday because of her religious beliefs.7" Mr. Justice
Brennan who wrote the opinion, rejected the claim that the result
constituted an "establishment" of religion, asserting that it merely
"reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neu-
trality in face of religious differences. . . . ,7 Mr. Justice Stew-
art, concurring in a separate opinion, retorted that "it is the Court's
624, 638 (1943). See Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Rule of Law, 8 UTAH L. REV.
1 (1962).
73 Schumb, Religion in the Public Schools, 3 SANTA CLARA LAW. 135, 151 (1963).
74 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560, 1612,
1617 (1963).
75 Sherbert v. Verner, 83 Sup. Ct. 1790 (1963).
76 Id. at 1797.
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duty to face up to the dilemma posed by the conflict between the
Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution and the Establishment
Clause as interpreted by this Court.
7 7
In fairness it should be said that the task of the Court is
difficult and complex, as Justice Jackson acknowledged when he
said:
[T]he task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of
Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in
the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on official dealings
with the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-
confidence. . . .These changed conditions often deprive precedents
of reliability and cost us more than we would choose upon our own
judgment. But we act in these matters not by authority of our
competence but by force of our commissions.78
Whatever the usefulness of metaphors like "separation of
Church and State," "neutrality," "accommodation," and "involve-
ment," they should not obscure the difficulties and complexities of
the Court's task which are inherent in the judicial process. The
Court must articulate the "majestic generalities" of the Constitu-
tion into workable rules of decision, if they are to be meaningful
to us today and if equality and certainty are to be achieved. One
might add that the Court does so in these cases in spite of an
historical record which is "at best ambiguous.1
79
Viewed in the light of these considerations, one gains con-
siderable respect for the complexities and difficulties with which the
Supreme Court must deal in carrying out its role in our society.
77 Id. at 1800.
78 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
79 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 83 Sup. Ct. 1560, 1579
(1963).
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